The metadata service is only accessible from within the instance. Commands run from your local machine or another instance will work. Also ensure no host firewall (e.g., iptables) blocks 169.254.169.254 .
Instead:
(Instance Metadata Service version 1). Whenever it needed to know its own public IP or AMI ID, it would simply whisper a request to a secret local address: 169.254.169.254 . It was easy, fast, and completely unauthenticated. The Shadow of the SSRF But the cloud was not always safe. Villains known as
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?> <!DOCTYPE html ...> <title>405 Method Not Allowed</title> curl-url-http-3A-2F-2F169.254.169.254-2Flatest-2Fapi-2Ftoken
If you let me know your infrastructure setup, I can help with:
If an attacker achieves Remote Code Execution (RCE) but the application layer blocks outward PUT headers, access to cloud control planes is severely limited.
This example retrieves the instance ID. The metadata service provides a wide range of information, and you can access it by specifying the path in the URL. The metadata service is only accessible from within
The transition to token-based authorization stops SSRF vulnerabilities dead in their tracks by implementing two brilliant mitigation factors:
The X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds header defines how long (in seconds) the token remains valid. The maximum allowed limit is 6 hours (21,600 seconds). 4. Why is this Keyword Showing Up in Your Logs?
The specific keyword curl-url-http-3A-2F-2F169.254.169.254-2Flatest-2Fapi-2Ftoken represents the modern era of cloud attacks. Instead: (Instance Metadata Service version 1)
Get the full benefits of IMDSv2 and disable IMDSv1 ... - AWS
: Make a PUT request to /latest/api/token to generate a secret, time-bound session token.